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The American people sent a clear message on Nov. 7 that they 
will no longer accept the current course in Iraq. As a result, we have 
finally seen admissions of mistakes and failures, and long-overdue 
accountability. We have heard the choices regarding the future role of 
the United States in Iraq, from “cut and run” or “stay the course” to 
the Pentagon’s so-called “go big,” “go long,” or “go home,” and we now 
wait in anxious anticipation for the recommendations of the bipartisan 
Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. 
We will no doubt get some good ideas from the study group to add 
to the steady stream of ideas – good and bad – from politicians, pundits, 
think tank strategists, and many others over the past months and years 
who have been engaged with this conflict. What follows in this piece are 
some thoughts on what to do with those ideas, and a few added thoughts 
as well. Also included are some suggestions for what realities should 
be acknowledged before any plan can be advanced, a recommended 
structure for implementing any action plan for future U.S. involvement, 
and a list of requirements, in five areas – political, economic, security, 
What we have seen 
to date is confusion, 
incompetence and 
contradiction. We cannot 
at this point resort to 
cosmetic, scattershot 
proposals that have 
nothing behind them to 
try to correct the course. 
We have a last chance to 
correct things.
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social, and information/communications – that must be 
addressed in any truly comprehensive proposal. Given 
the mandate from the American people as a result of 
the mid-term elections, it is essential to get this right, 
now, or chance losing any support to see this through 
to a positive outcome.
ThE REALITIES
The first reality we should acknowledge is that there 
is no brilliant short-term strategic option or stroke of 
genius waiting to be unveiled. We have missed too many 
opportunities, and have created too much irreparable 
damage via the mistakes that were made, for that to 
be possible. We are now faced with a complex set of 
problems that will take time, commitment, resources, 
skill, and some luck to work through.
The second reality is that we cannot simply pull 
out, as much as we may want to. The consequences of 
a destabilized and chaotic Iraq, sitting in the center of 
a critical region of the world, could have catastrophic 
implications.
The third reality is that there is no short-term 
solution. It will take years to stabilize Iraq. How many? 
I believe at least five to seven, which doesn’t mean it 
has to be five to seven years of living with the current 
situation. It means we could see a steadily improving 
and stabilizing Iraq over that time.
The fourth reality is that the problem cannot be 
solved by simply addressing the security issues. Viable 
institutions must be built in addition to the military 
and police. Security is clearly a priority, and nothing 
else can take hold if the security environment is not 
reasonably stable. But security alone is not the answer.
 
 ThE STRUCTURE
The first step, before we can entertain or consider 
implementing “good ideas,” is to establish a structure 
to vet or screen recommendations; oversee and plan 
implementation; monitor progress and determine 
resource requirements; garner regional and inter-
national support; and integrate efforts. It will do us 
no good to have a disjointed set of ideas dumped on 
President George W. Bush and his administration for 
cherry picking. Nor will it work to farm out the selected 
ideas to various government agencies to implement 
independently. 
No other time in history begs more for interagency 
integration and cooperation within the U.S. government. 
The various stove-piped agencies, especially the 
departments of Defense and State, have traditionally 
and famously been dysfunctional as a cooperative entity. 
We can no longer afford the dysfunction and lack of 
coordination, especially in this situation. The structure 
proposed would be set up at three levels to ensure 
integration and coordination of all efforts in Iraq.
Bipartisan Executive Group
At the head of this proposed structure should be 
an executive or steering group. The members should be 
of the caliber of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. 
This group should provide continuous oversight and 
recommendations, and report periodically to the 
president and the Congress. Such a move would give 
this group and its efforts credibility in the region 
– internationally and domestically. The group would 
have the stature and prestige necessary to convene 
high-level international and regional conferences and 
summits, as some have recommended, in order to 
solicit support and involvement. The establishment 
of this group could also remove politics, as much as 
possible, from the equation and ensure that all views 
have a fair hearing. 
 
Interagency Task Force
This organization would report to the president, 
the National Security Council principals, and the 
Bipartisan Executive Group. It would be responsible for 
program development, integrated planning, interagency 
coordination, monitoring the implementation of 
programs, and resource determination. It would have 
five reconstruction components or subgroups. They 
would be in the areas of political reconstruction support, 
economic development, security, social programs, and 
information and communications programs. The task 





On the ground, we need quality implementation 
teams, working closely with the military and Iraqis at 
every level, to put into effect the coordinated programs 
developed by the Interagency Task Force. They would 
be task-organized based on the programs being 
implemented. Members would report to their respective 
agencies of government, as well as to the task force. 
Assembling the Structure and Assigning its 
Members
If we learned anything from the experience with 
temporary ad hoc organizations such as the Coalition 
Provisional Authority and the Office of Reconstruction 
and Humanitarian Assistance, it’s that simply selecting 
well-intentioned people cannot be the sole criterion 
for success. We need to staff these organizations with 
people who have subject matter expertise as well as 
regional and cultural savvy. This is a case where the 
best and the brightest are needed. We also need the 
reporting chains to be structured so that stove-piped 
bureaucracy does not restrict information flow, and 
interagency bickering does not prevent the healthy 
exchange of views, vertically or horizontally. 
This recommended structure will not be well-
accepted by the existing governmental establishment. 
Only the military understands integrated task 
organization for the mission. It’s time for interagency 
adoption  of this concept for extraordinary circum- 
stances where existing governmental structure is 
inadequate to meet the coordination and integration 
demands of the task.  The U.S. government has grappled 
with the issue of interagency integration for as long 
as there have been separate agencies. There is a clear 
consensus that the current structure is dysfunctional, 
and now is the time and opportunity to test a new 
approach.
ThE REqUIREMEnTS
All adopted ideas that get turned into 
implementation efforts at this point must answer a 
basic question, or meet a basic requirement, in each of 
the areas outlined below. To neglect any area will make 
successful stabilization more problematic. 
Political 
How do we help the Iraqi government succeed? The 
government in Iraq is a fragile one, under tremendous 
pressure from internal and external sources. The U.S. 
government is part of that pressure. Demands are made 
that may be beyond the ability of that government and 
its leaders to deliver. This is a fragmented society that 
has never known a true representative government, let 
alone democracy; the new system has been foisted upon 
them in a rapid-fire series of elections. The Iraqi society 
needs help. It is coping with monumental problems. 
Under the stress of near civil war, Iraqis are trying to 
sort out contentious constitutional issues such as local 
versus federal authority, revenue sharing, the role of 
Islam in governance, and the status of militias. 
This society has no history of anything other 
than authoritarian rule, so decision-makers get 
a cacophony of views from mutually distrustful 
elements of an unnatural state. The Iraqi government 
needs technocratic advice and expertise. International 
support in this area would be best. It should be in the 
form of advisory groups that can offer advice, options, 
recommendations, etc., for consideration on each of 
the plaguing issues that confront Iraq’s legislative and 
executive branches. Iraqis also need the help and support 
of mediation experts, preferably non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that specialize in mediation and 
facilitation. In the end, the sectarian factions will need 
to hash out their differences at a peace table. The U.S. 
administration may not like the attendees, but Iraqis 
“It’s not clear whether the United States is battling an insurgency, a war on terrorists, a 
civil war, or all of the above.”
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will need to sort it out among themselves. They can’t do 
it without the support of neutral, trusted facilitators. 
To function, all governments need bureaucratic 
institutions. A requirement exists to build these in Iraq. 
They must be reasonably effective and non-corrupt. 
Again, international support should be generated to 
help form these agencies. This is not asking for boots 
on the ground, but technocratic support and advice. 
In the end, a society struggling to cope with a hostile 
environment needs the viable institutions that allow 
it to survive and eventually prosper. The best way to 
help Iraq succeed is to help Iraq build institutions that 
give it the basis to survive and grow. These will be the 
political, economic, security, and social institutions 
necessary for stability.
For those who would advocate a split state – who 
would cave in to the ethnic, tribal, and religious 
differences that pull at the cohesion of this artificially 
created state – it is important to remember what the 
United States stands for. It is the beacon for those who 
want to live in a world that doesn’t divide itself along 
such lines. As much as Americans believe represent-
ative government is a right of all men and women, so 
are the cherished freedoms that unite Americans above 
its social differences. 
Besides, a partitioned Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd set 
of states simply will not work. A Sunni state would be 
landlocked and sorely lacking in natural resources to 
sustain itself; the Shiites would populate a sort of rump 
state in the south and encourage Shia populations in 
other states in the Gulf to separate; and the Kurds 
would also be landlocked, with Turkey looking over 
their shoulders, listening for them to utter any word 
of independence, at which time Ankara would react. 
Separating these three does not make sense and will 
exacerbate tensions to a point that could easily be 
destabilizing to the entire region. It will also send the 
wrong signal to others in the world who believe that 
tribal, ethnic, or religious identities should be the only 
basis for establishing states.
 
Economic 
How do we help build a viable Iraqi economy? 
Next to a secure environment, the development of a 
viable economy is the most critically important task. 
Iraqis want jobs. They want a way to make a decent 
living to support their families and have a happy life. 
Companies that are labor-intensive must be a priority. 
Investment is needed. A series of business development 
conferences sponsored by regional states, such as 
Jordan, with international support could encourage 
investment in companies vetted by U.S., international, 
and Iraqi government agencies to ensure their viability 
and integrity, and would be a sound beginning. The 
companies could get priority of contracting based on 
continuous auditing to ensure credibility.
The continued use of third-country nationals to 
work on lucrative contracts is a source of discontent that 
works against stabilization. Businesses and companies 
in more secure areas could be the start-up programs to 
encourage those in less secure areas, as an incentive, 
to cooperate to remove destabilizing elements. An 
astronomically high unemployment rate is a breeding 
ground for those who want to recruit dissidents to their 
cause.
American and international business executives 
could be enlisted to help with business-development 
ideas and mentoring programs for Iraqi business 
leaders. Partnerships, investment opportunities, and 
sponsorships could result, where appropriate, in the 
generation of positive economic activity. 
 
Security 
How do we build a competent and credible 
security force capable of dealing with the complex 
problems threatening Iraq? Military theorist Sun Tzu 
advised that we should first know our enemy. Has the 
administration tried in the case of Iraq? At first they 
were simply labeled “dead enders” and “insurgents,” 
yet there seems to be a much more mixed bag of 
threats. We have the al-Qaida elements, the remnant 
ex-Saddam Hussein supporters, the criminals, the 
sectarian militias, and the home-grown insurgents: 
five enemies and counting. Does one size fit all in terms 
of dealing with them? Can one negotiate with certain 
elements and not others? Are the strategy and tactics 
the same for all?
It’s not clear whether the United States is battling an 
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insurgency, a war on terrorists, a civil war, or all of the 
above. The administration has chosen to counter these 
disparate threats by creating an Iraqi security force 
focused on conventional combat units and police. How 
many Civil Affairs units have we created in the Iraqi 
forces? What about Psychological Operations units? Or 
Counter-Intelligence units? How many Iraqi medical, 
dental, veterinary, or engineer units accompany combat 
units into areas to win hearts and minds? Do Shia and 
Kurdish troops kick in the door in Sunni provinces, 
and how is that received? 
Imagine sending the New York National Guard to 
Alabama to handle a civil disturbance problem rather 
than having the Alabama National Guard be the first 
responders. The question decision-makers should ask 
is whether we are creating the right kind of security 
forces for the threat. Mass, combat power and numbers 
may not be the best answer. The type and quality of 
units and their ability to connect to the people should 
have greater priority. 
The coalition forces in Iraq are confronting a 
problem with the local militias. Since the initial 
operation had inadequate U.S. forces from the start, 
and thus were unable to prevent the evolution of the 
militias, the military forces are stuck with them. What 
is the solution? To confront them at this point could 
embroil the military in an all-out civil war. Can we 
offer a more enticing alternative? Could a local National 
Guard force be created to be a bridge between the locals 
and the national forces? Could militia members and 
potential future members be lured by better paychecks 
to serve in local units that offer missions such as civil 
affairs, local security, and construction that make their 
community better off and ensure their security, while 
cooperating with national forces?
Like the U.S. National Guard, these units could 
be federalized and have clear accountability and 
transparency, yet respond in the first instance to local 
authority. This approach, or something similar, could 
offer an acceptable alternative to the militias and make 
an Iraqi government decision to disband them more 
palatable.
There has been heated debate over U.S. troop levels in 
Iraq. Clearly, those levels have been inadequate, despite 
contentions that they are sufficient. Military forces 
have been unable to secure lines of communications 
and logistics and unable to interdict the enemy’s lines 
running across open borders. The forces have played, 
in the words of Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., “whack a 
mole” in moving units around to higher threat areas, 
exposing areas left behind to the return of hostile 
forces.
The principle behind the stated “Secure, Hold, and 
Build” strategy of the military requires holding and 
staying in an area long enough for the building process 
to be effective. Moving in and out or occupying with 
too few troops ensures the building process will fail. 
More troops are needed. The United States does not, 
however, have the force structure in the Army and 
Marine Corps to sustain even the current levels over 
the long haul. The U.S. military could, with difficulty, 
support a short-term increase in force if the increase 
would provide the security momentum to jump-start 
other programs.
Eventually, the U.S. military presence should 
be phased into a greater support role to Iraqi units 
as they become more capable, and eventually into 
a regional presence as back-up. The administration 
should continue a robust Security Assistance Program 
to Iraqi security forces for the long term and look to 
integrating them into a sorely needed regional security 
arrangement. This sequence requires a detailed and 
phased plan based on goals and conditions understood 
by Iraqi and American leaders. 
Social 
As much as we claim to understand that this is a 
struggle for hearts and minds, the U.S. administration 
has failed to win that battle. The Iraqi people have not 
bought into the concept of a unified Iraq as the best 
outcome for them – an Iraq worth fighting for. They 
have retreated behind their sectarian identities. The 
bad guys have created the necessary fear, apathy, or 
support for them to survive in the midst of the people. 
If the people saw them as the obstacles to a more secure 
and better life, they could not exist. 
The people need to be engaged, and they must have 
a voice. Mediation efforts to sort out the differences 
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between groups have to be implemented down to the 
neighborhood level. Youth programs, much like the 
Seeds of Peace, should be created to bring together 
young people to connect across sectarian lines before 
the hatred sinks in and drives them toward an ethnic or 
religious identity that prevents them from connecting. 
The “brain drain” causing educated Iraqis to flee must 
be reversed to ensure that the capacity for the society to 
function with quality leadership and skilled members 
is maintained. Programs such as these, that bring the 
people into the process of building a unified Iraq, are a 
necessary ingredient to success. The people cannot be 
uninvolved bystanders. 
Information and Communications
Are the administration’s messages reaching the 
Iraqi people? Iraqi leaders, with the help of Americans, 
must launch an effective information campaign 
– a national dialogue, a reconciliation program, a 
cathartic vetting of all the problems in Iraq. The trial 
and conviction of Saddam Hussein should have begun 
that process, but it failed to do so. Instead, it became a 
circus that had a greater polarizing effect rather than 
a uniting one. A program to use all media to engage 
and involve all levels of society should be developed 
for open discussion of the issues that divide, and 
cause friction and distrust. It should also be a public 
forum for soliciting recommendations for resolving 
issues and working together. Inter-sectarian groups 
should be formed to promote the dialogue and engage 
the differing communities. Media sources need to be 
effectively developed and incorporated to provide the 
means for dialogue and communication. 
Regional and International Engagement 
Can the administration get international and 
regional support to help in stabilizing Iraq? U.S. 
officials are now running around the world trying to 
solicit support to help America out of the mess that’s 
been made in Iraq. This will be a tough sell, since the 
United States rejected the UN process at the outset and 
bruised many allies with arrogant rhetoric and lack of 
consultation. One would suspect that the administration 
will now hear certain conditions laid down in exchange 
for their help. In the region, international actors will 
want a broader strategy that includes a region-wide 
security arrangement to replace the now shattered one. 
They will want re-engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process and more direct diplomacy to help bring 
into the fold outliers such as Syria and Iran. They will 
want the United States to work with them to improve 
relationships and images on each side. 
International involvement beyond the region will 
be dependent on some of the same conditions, but will 
also involve political and economic access and a voice 
that had been previously denied. Although boots on 
the ground may be a bridge too far for newly acquired 
allies at this point, burden sharing, political support 
and involvement, security training, and economic 
development support, among other things, can be 
secured. 
COnCLUSIOn
As stated previously, we are not wanting for ideas 
on how to stabilize Iraq. It will do us no good, however, 
just to produce a menu of ideas with no cohesive and 
comprehensive means to implement them. This requires 
planning, organization, clear direction, and true 
competence in the ranks. That is the principal message 
conveyed here. The ideas and proposals offered here 
may not be the best, or even viable. They are offered 
to spur thinking and show how they might fit into a 
critically needed structure necessary for any ideas to 
be translated into credible action. Even the structure 
proposed may not be the best, but again, the point is to 
recognize the need for structure in implementing any 
ideas.
What we have seen to date is confusion, 
incompetence and contradiction. We cannot at this 
point resort to cosmetic, scattershot proposals that 
have nothing behind them to try to correct the course. 
We have a last chance to correct things. The American 
people do not want to see failure. And they will not 
continue to support something that can’t clearly show 
progress and demonstrate success.   n
